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Abstract— Information systems in the digital age have 
become increasingly dependent on databases to store a 
multitude of fundamental data.  A key function of 
structured databases is to house authentication credentials 
that verify identity and allow users to access more salient 
personal data.  Authentication databases are frequently a 
target of attack as they potentially provide an avenue to 
commit further, more lucrative crimes.  Despite the 
provision of industry standard best practice 
recommendations from organisations such as Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP), Payment Card 
Industry Security Standards Council (PCI-SSC), Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) and Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), often practical security 
implementations within industry flounder.  Lacking or 
substandard implementations have cultivated an 
environment where authentication databases and the data 
stored therein are insecure.   
This was demonstrated in the 2016 exposure of a breach 
experienced by Yahoo where approximately one billion 
user credentials were stolen. The global technology 
company was found to be using obsolete security 
mechanisms to protect user passwords.  Dated 
implementations such as these pose serious threat as they 
render authentication data highly vulnerable to theft and 
potential misuse.   
This paper offers a novel solution for securing 
authentication databases on non-compliant Apache servers.  
The method applies the recommended best practice 
mechanisms in the form of salt, one-way encryption 
(hashing) and iterations to both pre-existing and newly 
created passwords that are stored on insecure systems.  The 
proposed solution can be implemented server-side, with 
little alteration to the existing infrastructure, unbeknownst 
to the user.  It possesses the potential to improve system 
security, aid compliance, preserve privacy and protect 
users.  
Keywords— passwords; salt; encryption, authentication; user-
credentials  
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to Intel Security and the Centre for Strategic & 
International Studies (CSIS), “Cybercrime is a growth industry 
where the returns are great and the risks are low” In a report 
produced in 2014, the group estimated the global economic 
cost at more than 400 billion US dollars annually [1]. This 
figure was approximated based on documented personal loss, 
organisational theft, damage to professional reputation and also 
global economic effect. 
Due to the sensitive nature of breaches, governments and 
organisations are reluctant to disclose the details of system 
vulnerabilities that have been key in each breach.  Hence, there 
is difficulty in identifying an exact cost figure relating to 
authentication data theft.  However, it can be stated that 
exposed authentication data often acts as a gateway to greater 
breaches [2].  Based on this premise, a substantial portion of 
the aforementioned sum could be attributed to insecure 
authentication data storage.  
Usernames and passwords currently remain the most 
commonly implemented and widely accepted form of identity 
verification [3].  Prior to the present focus on mitigating risk of 
cybercrime, typical web application authentication provisions 
were central repositories now referred to as ‘legacy databases’.  
Traditionally, the risk of breach was not contemplated and 
therefore passwords were frequently stored in plaintext [4].  It 
is claimed that a large number of these legacy databases remain 
in common use and still store authentication credentials in 
plaintext or by obsolete and substandard means [5].  
Frequent and successful compromises of authentication 
databases such as eHarmony and LinkedIn [6] have indicated 
an urgent need for a server-side solution capable of rectifying 
the security shortfalls of existing legacy databases, with an 
objective of protecting any pre-existing and future passwords 
written to the database.  Such a solution should provide a 
simple, convenient and affordable option that aids 
administrators in the mitigation of risks associated with 
compromised authentication data and user accounts. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In seeking a solution to secure noncompliant legacy databases, 
various associated areas were explored.  These included large 
scale legacy system breaches, best practice standards, state of 
the art authentication technologies, commonly implemented 
password policies and existing password strengthening 
applications. 
A. Legacy Databases, Breaches & Best Practice Standards 
An increase in incidents of cybercrime has forced industry 
to adapt and develop methods by which cybersecurity may be 
improved [7].  Expert groups such as OWASP have identified 
the protection of authentication credentials as chief in the 
prevention of additional crime [8].  Initial breaches occur 
largely by way of ‘injections’, an attack vector that tops the 
OWASP list of the ‘Most Critical Web Application Security 
Risks’, where attackers gain access to the content of databases 
[9].  Recent years have seen a plethora of breaches suffered by 
global corporations such as LinkedIn, Target, Ashley Madison 
and TalkTalk [10][7][11][12].  The end of 2016 alone saw the 
culmination of breaches experienced by large web-based 
companies such as Friend Finder, Yahoo and Hello Kitty.  The 
web accounts linked to these compromised credentials all 
contained private personal data belonging to both adults and 
minors [13]14][15]. The associated web accounts stored 
personal data that included financial and residential details, 
leaving the registered users directly susceptible to additional 
crime.   
Breaches such as these have highlighted the importance of 
securing authentication data, forcing a re-evaluation of the 
defences in place [6][7].  Adherence to standard guidelines 
such as the ‘OWASP Password Storage Cheat sheet’, the 
‘IEEE Standard Specifications for Password-Based Public-Key 
Cryptographic Techniques’ and ‘RFC 2898: Password-Based 
Cryptography Specification’ is recommended to prevent theft 
and misuse of passwords.  These documents offer guidance on 
the security mechanisms that must be invoked to protect stored 
authentication data.  As depicted in Figure 1, in order to 
maintain the confidentiality and integrity of credentials, best 
practice guidelines advise that all passwords should be:  
 Salted with a random string of not less than 32 
bytes [16] 
 Encrypted/hashed using a one-way, proven and 
un-cracked cryptographic hash function such as 
SHA-256 or SHA-512 [8][17] 
 The output of this hash function should be re-
hashed for no less than 1,000 iterations [18] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Application of salt, hashing & iterations to password 
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-
DSS), produced by the PCI-SSC, insists that at minimum, the 
above criteria must be met in order for organisations to be 
considered compliant [19].  However, despite a multitude of 
available information relating to best practice implementation, 
best practice and compliance still evade many organisations 
due to budget constraints, time factors and a reluctance to 
replace existing infrastructure [7][20][21]. 
Often, even organisations who attempt to adopt protective 
measures fail to implement best practice correctly [22].  
Subsequent investigation into password breaches has revealed 
that several of the companies maintained substandard 
implementations [5].  Yahoo, Friend Finder and Hello Kitty’s 
compromised databases were found to be storing passwords in 
plaintext or hashing with depreciated one-way encryption 
functions such as MD5 and SHA-128. Furthermore, all had 
omitted the use of salt and iterations within their password 
protection mechanisms [23][13][15].  The targeted 
organisations had not adhered to basic best practice 
recommendations and were therefore non-compliant.  Had the 
recommended basic best practice mechanisms been 
implemented, the user credentials may have been protected 
from potential misuse. 
It is improbable that organisations will openly declare that 
they maintain non-compliant implementations, as doing so 
compromises customer data, system security and company 
reputation.  Based on cost alone it is unlikely that organisations 
globally will improve or replace their entire existing 
infrastructure in a bid to mitigate risk [10][20].  An increase in 
successful breaches and industry’s failure to improve current 
infrastructure vociferates for a solution which utilizes an 
existing staple technology that can be discretely applied server-
side by an administrator, incurring minimal cost, effort and 
downtime.   
B. State of the Art Technologies 
 State of the art technologies such as biometric and multi-
factor authentication were assessed for applicability.  It was 
surmised that despite a considerable amount of current research 
and new developments, in view of the complexity, expense and 
unreliability of these more recent technologies and their 
hardware components, it is improbable that these solutions will 
be deployed for common practical use in the near future.  
Reliance upon passwords will remain [24]. 
C. Common Implementation of Password Policy 
 An examination of commonly implemented password 
security policies was conducted to establish if they increased 
security of user accounts.  The implementation of policies that 
dictate length, entropy and lifetime of passwords are successful 
in mitigating risk of unauthorized access to singular accounts 
via brute force or a dictionary attack.  However, passwords at 
rest in an authentication database remain vulnerable to 
exposure via an injection attack.   
D. Password Strengthening Applications 
 Several password management applications including 
Password Agent, Lucent Personalized Web Assistant (LPWA), 
PwdHash and Password Multiplier were assessed for 
functionality[25][26][27][28].  Operating essentially as 
pluggable web browser extensions, these solutions offer 
password strengthening and management features that aid in 
securing user accounts.  Despite implementing best practice 
recommendations, each solution operated client-side, therefore 
it was surmised that these applications were intended for 
private use by individuals wishing to strengthen authentication 
for assorted personal web accounts.  These applications could 
not provide a valid solution for organisations to improve the 
security of password storage server-side.  No commercial 
applications were discovered that assist administrators in 
applying best practice security measures to 
webserver/authentication database infrastructure.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
The following describes key methods and technologies that 
were invoked to develop, implement and test the proposed 
solution. 
A. Environment 
A suitable virtual Windows test environment was 
constructed that included an Apache web server.  The server 
was combined with a MySQL database to store authentication 
data and PHP authentication files to render web interfaces and 
 
perform basic user account registration and login authentication 
functions, as shown in Figure 2.  According to the Netcraft 
Web Server Survey of February 2016, open source Apache 
servers hold 32.80% of the market share of top servers on the 
internet [29].  This platform was selected based on popularity 
and common utilisation with online accounts.   
 
Fig. 2. Authentication via login interface verified via database 
The basic environment emulated that of a typical legacy 
system.  It contained no best practice mechanisms and no 
repository to store salt strings or protected passwords. The 
database simply contained a ‘Users’ table that stored account 
usernames and plaintext passwords.   
B. Apache Rewrites 
Apache mod_rewrite is a module that allows server-side 
manipulation of requested URLs. Incoming URLs are checked 
against a series of rules that contain a regular expression to 
detect a certain set of conditions.  If the conditions are found to 
be true in the URL, the desired portion of the URL is replaced 
with a provided substitution string or action. This process 
continues until there are no more rules or the process is 
explicitly told to stop. 
The mod_rewrite module can be utilized to manipulate 
URLs whilst they are being accessed.  It has the capacity to 
translate complex URLs into a more human-readable format 
still understandable by a server.  It can also be adapted to 
seamlessly redirect to other pre-constructed files that contain 
alternate functions; it was this capability that provoked its use 
as a key component in constructing a server-side authentication 
solution.   
C. PHP Authentication Files 
To implement a solution utilizing the features of the 
Apache mod_rewrite module, the server had to be configured 
to render the web interfaces from the original authentication 
files and then internally redirect all requests for authentication 
functions to alternate files.  This was achieved by creating new 
authentication files that contained functions to salt, hash and 
iterate passwords for user accounts that were newly created and 
also pre-existing accounts where passwords were stored in 
plaintext.  Upon rendering the web interface created in the 
original ‘Login Page’ file, instead of calling the functions from 
this file to conduct the authentication process, the system 
would redirect to a new file that would perform the functions to 
protect the password and then redirect back to the original file.  
The new authentication files were stored alongside the original 
files, in the HTTP folder on the web server.   
To force the server to redirect to alternate files and execute 
newly implemented functions, the web server configuration file 
was altered to include a set of mod_rewrite rules that dictated 
the conditions under which a redirect should occur.  The rules 
stipulated that when an attempt was made to access the login 
page, the web page should be rendered from the original file 
and then a redirect to the new protective file should occur.  The 
redirect would allow for the salt, hash and iteration functions 
from the new file to be executed.  Following the application of 
protective mechanisms and storage in the database, control 
would be passed back to the original file to finalise the 
authentication process, as shown in Figure 3.  The switch to the 
new files was executed seamlessly, without the browser URL 
displaying any indication of a redirect.   
 
Fig. 3. Authentication with original and new PHP files 
D. MySQL Database 
The database present in the original insecure environment 
contained a single table to store usernames and plaintext 
passwords, with no column present to store randomly 
generated salt strings.  The newly created authentication files 
were configured to assess if a salt table was already present in 
the database.  If no table was present, one was created with 
columns to store the username, salt string and protected 
password for each user account.  This process was triggered by 
any attempt to log in or register a new account.  Upon creation 
of the salt table, the user’s original plaintext password, stored 
in the pre-existing Users table was replaced with a randomly 
generated string of characters.  Figure 4 depicts the new 
distribution of data. 
 
Fig. 4. Pre-existing database and new altered database with Salt table 
Following the creation of the salt table, users who were 
logging in for the first time since the changes were invoked 
would have the aforementioned protective mechanisms applied 
to their credentials.  Users who were conducting subsequent 
login attempts were authenticated initially based on their 
hashed password.  When control was transferred back to the 
original authentication file, users were authenticated once again 
based on the random string present in the pre-existing user 
table.  All newly created accounts automatically stored the 
username, salt string and hashed password in the Salt table and 
stored the username and randomly generated string of 
characters in the pre-existing Users table.  Authentication was 
then conducted in the aforementioned manner.  The purpose of 
the insertion of a random string in the password field of the 
original Users table was to remove the plaintext password and 
to confuse a would-be attacker with two potential passwords.  
The second password is authenticated automatically by the 
system without a user prompt, however it is important to note 
that authentication must be successfully executed using both 
passwords to be granted further access. 
From this point forward, any subsequent successful 
authentication attempts resulted in the automatic protection of 
passwords stored in plaintext.  At no point was the user 
prompted to actively change their password. 
IV. RESULTS 
On invoking the use of Apache re-writes, the system had 
been successfully manipulated to: 
 Create a salt table (if none existed) to store the 
username, salt and protected password 
 Salt, hash and iterate all passwords for newly 
registered user accounts 
 Salt, hash and iterate each plaintext password for 
pre-existing user accounts when users successfully 
logged in 
 Successfully authenticate for both new and old 
accounts 
 
A test environment was constructed whereby the rendered 
webpages were accessed remotely from a client machine on the 
same network.  The success of this implementation was 
explored through results relating to functionality, viability, 
reliability and security.  
A. Functionality 
The functionality of the implemented solution was assessed 
via login attempts from a remote client on the same network.  
While authenticating, the mod_rewrite module was activated 
and successfully redirected to new authentication files and 
applied best practice mechanisms to passwords without any 
changes to the URL in the browser bar.  Essentially, this 
indicated that the redirects had occurred unbeknownst to the 
client/user.  Redirects were further verified by the presence of 
the username, salt string and protected password within the Salt 
table.   
The redirects were not found to raise any session alerts or 
flag any suspicious activity on the server or client systems.  
This was due to the fact that the redirects were conducted 
server-side, before the client received any data relating to GET 
and POST requests.  From the server’s perspective, the 
mod_rewrite module was simply meeting the conditions and 
rules stipulated in the server configuration file and carrying out 
the functions as defined in the new authentication files.  From 
the client’s perspective, the system was simply rendering the 
pages received following GET requests and returning user 
input to the server in the form of POST requests.  This 
indicated that the solution could be implemented without any 
negative ramifications on the client or server systems.  Table I 
depicts the impact of redirects on invoked security devices and 
software applications, the solution could be implemented 
without experiencing any interference from infrastructural 
security implementations. 
Table I. Redirect Alerts by Security Devices & Software 
Device/Software Type Alert Raised Redirect Successful 
Web Browser Security Features   
Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS)   
Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS)   
Firewall   
Antivirus Software   
The solution was also trialed with several popular web 
browsers including Google Chrome, Microsoft Internet 
Explorer and Mozilla Firefox.  Redirects were found to be 
successful with all the browsers tested, thus, the solution was 
proven to be browser independent.  
Overall these assessments indicated that the solution could 
potentially be implemented without any negative impact on the 
functionality of the client or server systems.  It was also noted 
that the original authentication process carried out by the 
legacy system was neither truncated nor discarded.  The system 
still conducted the same sequence of steps that were present 
prior to the new implementation; However, the solution had 
added additional steps to the authentication process that 
allowed for new and old passwords to be protected.  Not only 
were passwords being protected to best practice 
recommendations, but two successful authentication sequences 
were subsequently required to access user accounts.  
B. Viability 
The implemented solution was found to be a viable server-
side option for administrators seeking to apply best practice 
recommendations to legacy authentication databases.  The 
solution successfully implemented security mechanisms in the 
form of salt, hashing and iterations to protect new and old 
passwords, thus securing user accounts. 
This was achieved without incurring any additional cost of 
overhauling the system or installing new software.  The results 
indicated that the method invoked is a viable, cost effective 
solution that could be introduced to secure existing systems 
that store passwords by substandard means.  Furthermore, the 
solution could be implemented with relatively little downtime.  
Table II below outlines the infrastructural changes required to 
implement the solution. 
Table II. Infrastructural Changes for Implementation 
Component Change Required 
PHP  Two new files created 
HTTP  Activate mod_rewrite module Add code to configuration file 
MySQL Generation of Salt table (Automatic) 
It must be noted that the solution requires implementation 
by an individual who is competent in system configuration, 
PHP and MySQL.  This is based on the premise that currently 
the solution must be implemented manually.  There is potential 
for the necessary alterations to be executed by a pre-defined 
script; however this requires the parameter and variable names 
to be included in the script.  Creation of the script would entail 
knowledge of the system in place, or temporary introduction of 
monitoring software that could identify and communicate the 
data required to automate the process. 
This solution is currently only suitable for Apache web 
servers as the primary technology invoked is the Apache 
mod_rewrite module.  It is possible that the solution could be 
adapted for alternative platforms, provided the given server 
possesses a similar URL rewrite function. 
C. Reliability 
The implemented solution was found to be completely 
reliable and thus, the method could be permanently invoked.  
The experiments conducted demonstrated that redirects and 
protective PHP functions would continue to be executed as 
long as the rewrite conditions and rules were present in the web 
server configuration file.   
D. Security 
To test the security of the implemented solution, an attack 
in the form of an SQL injection was executed on the system.  
This attack was designed to extract usernames and passwords 
from the database so that they may theoretically be used for 
other purposes.   
To facilitate the attack, a dynamic SQL statement had been 
deliberately placed within the authentication files.  This was 
included as a feature of the original ‘insecure environment’.  It 
is typically considered bad practice to include dynamic 
statements, as they can increase the attack surface of a system, 
rendering it vulnerable to injections.  Despite the recommended 
use of prepared statements, this secure coding practice is often 
omitted due to poor programming skills, technical requirements 
or repeated re-working of code.  Use of prepared statements 
reduces risk but does not entirely mitigate injections as an 
attack vector. 
The SQL injection was successfully executed and resulted 
in the extraction of all the information contained within the 
Users and Salt tables. 
Successful penetration of the database unequivocally 
demonstrated the following: 
1. The legacy test environment was insecure and 
vulnerable to attack.   
2. The unprotected pre-existing plaintext passwords stored 
in the Users table were vulnerable and could easily be 
compromised and potentially misused.   
The SQL injection extracted all usernames and passwords 
present in both tables.  Whilst the plaintext passwords required 
no decipher process and could be immediately utilised, the new 
hashed passwords would be considered virtually worthless.  
Significant processing would be required to restore the 
passwords to a usable form, necessitating a rainbow tables 
attack to un-iterate, un-hash and un-salt each individual 
password string.  Given the inclusion of the cryptographically 
secure SHA-256 hashing mechanism, this process would be 
extremely complex and time consuming, if even possible at all. 
Table III outlines the potential attack vectors where the 
solution has mitigated risk.   
Table III. Attack Vectors Mitigated by Implemented Solution 
Attack Vector Risk Mitigated 
Injection  
Security Misconfiguration  
Sensitive Data Exposure  
Using Known Vulnerable 
Components  
Misuse of Authentication 
Credentials  
Brute Force Attack  
Rainbow Tables Attack  
 
Despite National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) depreciation of hashing methods such as SHA-128 and 
MD5, the mechanisms remain commonly implemented.  In 
February 2017, Google discovered the first official SHA-128 
collision, conclusively identifying the function as insecure [30].  
In systems where SHA-128 is utilized, the proposed solution 
may be invoked to over-ride the noncompliant implementation 
and aid migration to a Federal Information Processing Standard 
(FIPS) approved secure hash standard such as SHA-256 or 
SHA-512. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the protective mechanisms introduced by the 
implemented solution were found to greatly increase the 
security of the system.  As demonstrated by the SQL injection, 
unprotected passwords stored in the Users table were easily 
extracted and thus were potentially available for nefarious use.  
The passwords that had undergone the salt, hash and iteration 
process maintained integrity and confidentiality. These 
passwords would require reverse engineering to be converted 
back to a usable plaintext state.   
In a case where passwords have been successfully hashed, 
but salt has been omitted, a rainbow tables attack could still 
potentially decipher the plaintext password.  Concatenation of 
salt and iterated hashing are crucial in placing large demands 
on the resources of an attack system and complicating the 
decipher process.   
The retention of the original authentication function 
contributed to the improvement of the system’s overall 
security.  Although the enhanced system authenticated based 
on the hashed password stored in the Salt table, the original 
authentication sequence also had to be executed for a user 
session to be initiated.   
The concept of adding randomly generated hexadecimal 
strings to the password column in the original Users table 
served several purposes.  These included the continued 
execution of the pre-existing authentication process, the 
removal of the plaintext password from the database and it also 
sought to confuse a would-be attacker.  If the contents of both 
tables were obtained, the random hexadecimal strings would 
appear to be hashed passwords.  In theory the attacker could 
spend lengthy periods trying to un-hash these individual strings 
by way of a rainbow tables attack; but this would be 
impossible, as the inserted strings were randomly generated. 
The attacker would also be unaware that the system 
authenticates twice, initially based on the hashed password 
present in the Salt table and then on the random string present 
in the Users table.  Without the plaintext password matching 
the hashed version stored in the Salt table, the random 
password stored in the Users table is rendered useless.  An 
understanding of this nested process would require 
familiarization with the content of the authentication files.   
The rewrite implements security mechanisms that comply 
with best practice recommendations, including 32 bytes of salt, 
one-way hashing using SHA-256 and no less than 1,000 
iterations [16][17][18].  Inclusion of these best practice 
mechanisms meets compliance recommendations outlined by 
organisations such as the IEEE, IETF, PCI-SSC and OWASP, 
in compliance with documents such as PCI-DSS and HIPAA 
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act).  These 
recommendations are considered basic requirements of secure 
authentication data storage, yet all recommended mechanisms 
can potentially be improved.  Stronger measures could be 
easily incorporated, however enhanced security may result in 
latency when the server is experiencing high demand.   
Increased salt bytes, longer hashing functions and additional 
iterations all place higher demands on system resources.   
Overall, the solution does not appear to have introduced 
any additional security risks.  Vulnerabilities present in the 
system are inherent to Apache, PHP and MySQL, and would 
be present regardless of the implemented solution.   
Breaches like that experienced by Yahoo not only 
compromised Yahoo account holders, but customers of large 
corporations such as British Telecom, AT&T, SBCGlobal, 
Verizon.net and BellSouth, who all relied on Yahoo for their 
customer email service.  Had Yahoo implemented a solution 
such as this to over-ride their use of the depreciated MD5 hash 
function, the compromise of approximately one billion user 
credentials could have been prevented.  
The application of this solution has been successful in 
improving security on a highly vulnerable system, with few 
negative ramifications.  This implementation has proven 
successful in encouraging a shift toward compliance with 
several standards including PCI-DSS, HIPAA and Data 
Protection Act requirements, improving system security, aiding 
compliance, preserving privacy and protecting users.  
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